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I. INTRODUCTION

U

nder the New Jersey Constitution, all criminal defendants are entitled to pre-trial release if secured
by sufficient bail to ensure their presence at all
subsequent court appearances.1 Traditionally, a
defendant or a close family member pledges the family nest
egg or offers the family home as collateral for their loved one’s
pre-trial release.2 If the defendant
fails to appear for court, that collateral, i.e., money or house, will be
forfeited. Such a bail arrangement is
often effective in guaranteeing a defendant’s appearance in court.3
Yet too often criminal defendants, especially alleged drug traffickers and gang members who lack
lawful means of support, pledge
thousands of dollars for bail money
that is derived from criminal activity.4 In other cases, some shadowy
figure with little or no meaningful
connection to the defendant will
come forward with the requisite bail
money, usually in exchange for a cut
of the criminal proceeds.5 The use of proceeds stemming from
illegal activities, pledged by either the defendant or one of his
cohorts, defeats the purpose of bail.6 When a criminal defendant’s liberty is secured by illegal proceeds, he has far less of
an incentive to appear for trial because the loss of this money
can be seen as the cost of doing business.7
To combat this problem, the New Jersey Legislature revised three bail statutes in 2007. These revisions provided for
the increased scrutiny of bail arrangements by trial courts and
prosecutors to determine the sufficiency and reliability of both
the bail pledged and those who pledged it.8 Accordingly, the law
now allows for court-ordered hearings to examine the source of
4

bail money,9 which can provide valuable information about the
motivations for a defendant to appear.10 The Legislature thus
recognized that the fundamental purpose of bail could not be
achieved if a defendant were free to post with ill-gotten gains or
if the defendant has no legitimate relationship with, or responsibility to, the person posting. Simply stated, the “bail set by a
court is not a ransom which will allow a defendant to flee if he
or she is able to afford it.”11
While these revised bail source inquiry statutes enhanced
the capacity of the New Jersey legal system to combat the use
of criminal proceeds as bail, the statute failed to articulate the
procedural features of these bail source hearings.12 Instead, the
New Jersey Supreme Court was tasked with adopting a set of
“procedure[s] to determine the sufficiency of bail.”13 This lack of direction, coupled with the Court’s
incomplete response,14 has resulted
in confusion, a lack of uniformity,
and disparate rules for conducting
bail source hearings throughout the
New Jersey trial courts. To date,
there is only one available court decision interpreting the bail source
statute.15 This decision attempts to
establish the burdens of parties to
bail source hearings.16 Yet in doing
so the Wright court made some
fundamental missteps that have resulted in a flawed interpretation of
the statute.17
Part II of this article examines New Jersey’s bail source
statute,18 as well as the New Jersey court rule governing bail
source hearings19 Part III summarizes the facts and holding of
Wright,20 and Part IV analyzes the case’s outcome.21 Part V suggests a different framework for conducting bail source hearings
in New Jersey. This article concludes in Part VI that the Legislature should revise the bail source statute to formally assign
the burdens of production and proof to the defendant in a bail
source hearing and thus, in effect, legislatively overrule a significant aspect of the Wright holding.
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II. NEW JERSEY’S BAIL SOURCE STATUTE
The original version of N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:162-13
was enacted on January 9, 2004 and permitted trial courts to inquire about the source of funds used for bail.22 These bail source
hearings were deemed discretionary and enabled the courts to
determine the relationship of the defendant to the person posting bail, the defendant’s interest in ensuring that the bail is not
forfeited, and whether the funds used to post bail were acquired
through criminal conduct.23 The statute permitted courts to thus
“examine, under oath or otherwise, any person who may possess
relevant information” and allowed the courts to inquire into several factors of persons posting cash and to question the source
of money or property pledged to secure bail.24 The Legislature
simultaneously passed a related statute that directed the New
Jersey Supreme Court to adopt procedural rules for conducting
bail source hearings.25
On June 1, 2007, the Legislature adopted an updated version of §§ 2A:162-13 as part of a sweeping legislative initiative
designed to provide law enforcement with tools to “combat the
growing menace of street gangs in New Jersey.”26 Under the
new law, a person charged with bail restrictions27 who posts
cash bail or secures a bail bond must provide the prosecutor
with relevant information about (1) the obligor; (2) the indemnifier or person posting cash bail; (3) the security offered; and
(4) the source of the money or property used to post cash bail or
secure the surety or bail bond.28 The law requires a criminal defendant first to complete and submit a form detailing the source
of their bail to the prosecutor.29 After reviewing the bail source
form, the prosecutor may request a formal bail source hearing.30
If the offense is a bail-restricted crime, the court shall conduct
a bail source hearing; at the request of the prosecutor, the court
will then issue an order either approving or rejecting the bail.31
In cases where the defendant is charged with an offense that is
not a bail-restricted crime, the trial court still has the discretion
to conduct a bail source hearing if requested by the prosecutor.32
The court may further conduct such a hearing at the request of
the prosecutor if the individual is charged with an offense other
than a bail-restricted crime and later posts cash bail or secures
a bail bond.33
Under the statute, the court cannot issue an order approving the bail unless it is first satisfied with several issues.34 First,
the court must find that the evidence adduced in the inquiry
establishes the reliability of the source of funds used to post
bail or security offered.35 Second, the relationship of the obligor or person posting cash bail must be sufficient to ensure the
defendant’s presence in court when required.36 Third, the court
must believe that the funds used to post cash bail or secure a bail
bond were not acquired through criminal or unlawful conduct.37

Criminal Law Brief

The most significant change from the 2004 statute to the
current version is the transfer of discretion from the courts to the
prosecutor in determining whether a bail source hearing should
be held when a defendant has been charged with a crime with
bail restrictions.38 By removing judicial discretion to deny a request for these hearings, the statute relieves prosecutors of the
need to make an initial showing that the source of bail funds
are suspect.39
Like the 2004 version, the revised bail source statute directed the New Jersey Supreme Court to devise the procedural
rules for bail source hearings.40 In assigning the court the task
of determining hearing procedures, the revised statute failed to
include any specific procedural rules of its own.41 On September 1, 2008, over one year after the revised statute became law,
the Supreme Court issued a number of procedural rules for bail
source hearings. However, those rules predominantly concerned
time and notice requirements.42 The court rules provided that the
state could request a bail source hearing either orally or in writing at any time prior to trial.43 If the defendant is still in custody
at the time the hearing is requested, the rule requires that the defendant remain in custody until further order of the court.44 If the
defendant has been released prior to the state’s request for a bail
source hearing, the rule holds the defendant’s bail until completion of the hearing.45 The rule summarizes the requirements of
the bail source statute by instructing the court to make findings
of fact regarding all aspects of the bail arrangement and to issue
an order declaring the bail arrangement satisfactory or unsatisfactory.46 In the event of an unsatisfactory bail arrangement
where the defendant has already been released, the defendant
must be returned to custody and held until a sufficient arrangement is produced.47 The rule neither addresses which party bears
the burdens of proof or production nor holds which standard of
proof is necessary to satisfy a bail source inquiry.48

III. NEW JERSEY V. WRIGHT
The absence of direction from both the Legislature and the
state Supreme Court regarding the burdens of proof and persuasion in bail source hearings has caused confusion in New Jersey
trial courts, as evidenced by the only published opinion on the
issue, Wright.49 On June 16, 2008, defendant Jermaine Wright
was arrested with a codefendant on first-degree drug possession charges, after they were allegedly caught in possession of
almost one pound of cocaine.50 Making matters worse, Wright
allegedly possessed the cocaine within a school zone and within
500 feet of a public park.51 Bail was set in municipal court at
$150,000, cash or bond.52 At the time of his arrest Wright was
already free on $135,000 bail on an earlier, unrelated first degree drug distribution charge.53
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On June 25, 2008, a bail hearing was conducted in the Superior Court, Law Division, at which time the State requested
that bail be increased, arguing that
Wright was a considerable flight risk in
light of the fact that he was facing two
first degree drug possession charges
and, if convicted on either, he faced a
possible life sentence under the repeat
drug offender sentencing statute.54 Bail
was then increased to $200,000 cash
or bond, and at that time the State requested a bail source hearing.55
Wright and his codefendant were
subsequently indicted on first, second
and third degree drug possession counts
and conspiracy.56
In anticipation of the source hearing, the trial court issued a written
opinion in the case, wherein the court
identified that the applicable statute was
silent on several important procedural
aspects of the bail source hearing.57 In
particular, the Wright decision noted
that neither the statute, nor New Jersey
Court Rule 3:26-8, “allocate the burden of proof or define the
standard of proof.”58

In assigning the burden of production on the defendant the
Wright court created a requirement that the State was first required to make a prima facie showing
that the bail arrangement was insufficient or the proceeds tainted before the
burden of production shifts to a defendant.66 Although articulating that the
showing by the State “should not be extremely difficult,” the Wright court did
not specify what the State was required
to show in order to obtain a bail source
hearing.67 The court also made no distinction between bail-restricted cases
and cases not charging crimes with bail
restrictions.68

The Wright court is

overly cautious in its
concern that placing
the burden

of persuasion on

criminal defendants

C. STANDARD OF PROOF

The Wright69 decision concluded
by determining that the State has the
ultimate burden of proving that a bail
arrangement is insufficient to ensure a
defendant’s appearance in court, and
must do so by a preponderance of the
evidence.70 In doing so, the Wright court
relied on State v. Casavina,71 finding that since the State was
seeking to deny bail, it must do so by a preponderance.72 The
Wright court reasoned that since Casavina required the State to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant
should not be eligible to participate in the ten percent option
for bail, the State must also establish by a preponderance of
the evidence that a bail arrangement is insufficient to ensure a
defendant’s presence at future court appearances.73

violates their state

constitutional rights.

A. BURDEN OF PROOF AT A BAIL SOURCE HEARING
The court began its analysis by examining general principles of allocation of burdens of proof, surveying case law and
determining that while neither the Legislature, nor the Supreme
Court, articulated a burden of proof for bail source hearings, it
is common for both the bodies to allow burden of proof standards to develop through case law.59 The Wright court then,
after employing a multi-faceted analysis, determined that the
State should have the burden of persuasion.60 In so concluding
the Court in Wright reasoned that since the State was seeking
to “overturn” defendant’s bail by claiming its source renders it
insufficient, it was the party relying on a fact and thus has the
burden of establishing it.61 In addition, the Court in Wright 62
relying on State v. Zorillo63, reasoned that placing a burden of
persuasion on criminal defendants would infringe on their state
constitutional right to bail.64

B. BURDEN OF PRODUCTION
Although expressly rejecting the argument that because defendant has better access to information about his bail arrangement and therefore should bear the burden of persuasion, the
Wright court determined this was an appropriate basis to shift
the burden of production to defendant.65

6

IV. ANALYSIS OF THE WRIGHT DECISION
The Wright decision begins on a faulty premise: in requesting a bail source hearing the State is not seeking to “overturn”
the court’s order setting the amount of bail, nor attempting to
“set aside an order already in place . . . .”74 The Wright court
twice incorrectly reasoned that the State should have the burden
of persuasion because it is seeking to overturn the bail already
in place.75 The State in the Wright case did not challenge the
$200,000 bail; rather the State sought a hearing to determine
who was pledging defendant’s bail and whether the source of
the bail proceeds was from illegal activity.76 These are two separate proceedings and the request for a source hearing should not
be viewed as a second bite at the apple to overturn the amount
of bail. A defendant’s right to bail does not sweep so broadly as
to allow a defendant to pledge money that is tainted.
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The Wright court is overly cautious in its concern that placing the burden of persuasion on criminal defendants violates
their state constitutional rights.77 The right to bail in New Jersey is not absolute and has several conditions.78 This right is
“clearly qualified by, among other limitations, compliance with
the conditions of bail . . . .”79 The bail source hearing is not an
encumbrance on the right to bail, but rather a condition of it.
Similarly, defendants subject to source hearing requirements
must demonstrate, by a modest level of proof, that their bail
money is not derived from criminal activity.80 This demonstration is no more stringent a bail condition than others placed on
defendants seeking pre-trial release.
Moreover, Wright’s reliance on the Rhode Island v. Zorillo
court’s proposition that placing the burden of proof and production on a criminal defendant violates that defendant’s constitutional right to bail is unpersuasive.81 The terms of N.J.S.A.
2A:162-13 are different from those of the Rhode Island statute
that were declared unconstitutional in Zorillo.82 In addition,
the New Jersey Constitution’s right to bail is quite different
from Rhode Island’s. Unlike the New Jersey Constitution,83 the
Rhode Island Constitution84 does not grant the right to bail to all
criminal defendants.85 Rather, there are large classes of criminals not entitled to bail.86 There bail is a two-step process, where
first, the state attempts to deny bail outright, and if unsuccessful,
then requests a source hearing.87 The Zorillo court specifically
found the state’s attempt to use the source hearing as a means of
thwarting bail to be unconstitutional, due to the state’s attempt
to deny bail outright.88 This endeavor was exacerbated by the
high standard of proof that Rhode Island defendants had to meet
to prove the legitimacy of their bail money.89
Zorillo illustrated that although the state shouldered the initial burden of proving a defendant ineligible for bail in phase
one, it could effectively shirk this burden altogether by requesting a bail source hearing, thus transferring the burden to the
defendant. As a result, the state’s actions were found unconstitutional.90 In fact, Zorillo indicated that to avoid constitutional
challenges, trial courts could inquire about the source of bail
during the first phase of the bail proceeding, thereby eliminating the chance that the state would seek to evade its burden of
proving the defendant ineligible for bail.91 The combination of
bail availability to virtually all criminal defendants in New Jersey, and the low standard of establishing untainted bail money,
result in the proposed and constitutional framework set out infra
Part V. Thus given the marked differences in the state constitutional rights to bail in New Jersey and Rhode Island, the Wright
court’s reliance on Zorillo is misplaced.
The Wright court’s analysis further unravels when it relies on Casavina92 and cites federal bail law.93 Both Casavina
and federal bail law contain presumptions regarding a defendant’s right to bail or to the ten percent option for posting
bail.94 Accordingly, the state or government must overcome
Criminal Law Brief

these presumptions by a preponderance of the evidence. There
is no presumption that all bail arrangements are sufficient or
untainted. Therefore, the Wright court is incorrect in asserting
that the state must provide, via a preponderance of the evidence,
proof that the bail is tainted because no contrary presumption
exists.95 Moreover, the fact that defendants have a state constitutional right to bail does not change the calculus. Mr. Wright’s
bail was set at $200,000; the state’s request for a source hearing
did not unduly infringe on this right to bail, but instead simply
ensures that the bail is untainted.96 Consequentially, the state
should not bear the burden of proof.
The Wright decision correctly placed the burden of production on defendant, because he is in a better position to more
quickly produce records rather than waiting for bank and tax record subpoenas to be issued and returned. However, the Wright
court made another fundamental misstep by grafting a separate
condition onto the rule, requiring the state to make a prima
facie showing,97 even in crimes with bail restrictions, before it
can obtain a bail source hearing. While the court rule explicitly
states that in crimes without bail restrictions the state “must
demonstrate a reasonable and well grounded basis to warrant
an inquiry by the court,” there is no similar provision for bail
source hearings in crimes with bail restrictions.98 Rather, under
both the statute and the court rule regarding crimes with bail
restrictions, the state need only request a hearing and the court is
required to conduct one.99 In Wright, the defendant was charged
with a crime with bail restrictions, and although the state made a
timely request for a bail source hearing, the court superimposed
this requirement onto the court rule as a condition precedent to
the granting of a hearing.100 Since neither the bail source statute
nor the court rule governing bail source hearings requires such
a showing by the state to be granted a hearing, the Wright court
thus exceeded its authority and directly contradicted the statute.

V. A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR CONDUCTING
BAIL SOURCE HEARINGS IN NEW JERSEY COURTS
A criminal defendant is in a better position to shoulder the
burdens of proof and persuasion at a bail source hearing, and
should do so by a preponderance of the evidence.
The bail source statute appears to place the burden on a
defendant to demonstrate that his bail money was lawfully acquired.101 As written, the statute prohibits the
court at the conclusion of the bail source inquiry from
issuing an orderapproving the bail unless it is satisfied
that the evidence adduced in the inquiry establishes the
reliability of the source of the funds used to post bail
or security offered, that the relationship of the obligor
or person posting cash bail is sufficient to ensure the
7

defendant’s presence in court when required, and that
the funds used to post cash bail or secure a bail bond
were not acquired as a result of criminal or unlawful
conduct.102
This language implies that the defendant bears the burden
of proof. The defendant would introduce evidence establishing
(1) the sufficiency of his relationship with the obligor, and (2)
that his bail funds were not the fruits of criminal conduct.
It seems appropriate that the burdens of proof and persuasion are placed on defendants to demonstrate why their posted
bail should be approved.103 The New Jersey Constitution does
not outlaw the imposition of all burdens on defendants.104 Criminal defendants are better able to shoulder these burdens because they know the source of their bail funds.105 In the interest
of obtaining an expeditious yet informed determination by the
court, the ultimate burden of persuasion should be borne by the
defendant.106
In cases where the defendant is not charged with a crime
with bail restrictions, and where the state must demonstrate
a reasonable and well-grounded basis to warrant a hearing, it
would be appropriate to impose a concomitant burden of both
production and persuasion on the defendant once the state’s
initial burden is met. Courts in both New York107 and Rhode
Island108 impose this requirement. By placing the burden of production on the defendant, the court avoids the potential delay of
defendant’s release, which could occur upon adjournment for
the state to conduct its own investigation.109 Far from being an
unconstitutional burden, requiring a defendant to provide sufficient information to the trial court to justify release gives the
defendant an incentive to do so completely and accurately.110
Trial courts are entitled to the most complete and accurate information available to make a proper determination regarding
whether bail should be allowed.111
The New Jersey Legislature should amend thebail source
statute and require criminal defendants to bear the burden of
persuading trial courts, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the money or property posted as collateral is not the fruit of
unlawful conduct. The preponderance of the evidence standard
is reasonable and fair to both defendant and the state.112 Implementation of this standard will allow for an appropriate inquiry
by the court, will satisfy prosecutors’ need to know the lawfulness of a bail’s source, and will be met by defendants with little
difficulty

VI. CONCLUSION
New Jersey’s revised bail source statute is a promising step
in ensuring that criminal defendants are not allowed to post the
proceeds of criminal activity to secure their pre-trial release and
8

that they have a real and meaningful relationships with the people posting bail. However, the statute is incomplete. The current
statute should be amended to assign the burdens of proof and
production at bail source hearings to criminal defendants, and to
require a showing by a preponderance of the evidence. Alternatively, the New Jersey Supreme Court should revise its applicable rules governing bail source hearings to assign these burdens
to criminal defendants, who are best equipped to shoulder them.
Without such affirmative statements by either the Legislature or
the Supreme Court, trial courts may misinterpret the bail source
statute, as demonstrated by the Wright decision.113
CLB

N.J. CONST. ART. I, § 11 (granting defendants the right to bail in noncapital cases).
2
See id. (providing for pre-trial release based on “sufficient sureties”).
3
See New Jersey v. Simpson, 839 A.2d 896, 901 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2003). “It is difficult to conceive of a matter more central to the administration of the criminal justice system than the appearance of defendants before the court as the court requires.” Id.
4
See In re Moffitt, Zwerling & Kemler, P.C., 846 F. Supp. 463, 475
(E.D. Va. 1994) (explaining that “[c]ourts have frequently remarked
on the fact the large sums of cash and drugs frequently go together”);
see also United States v. Thomas, 913 F.2d 1111, 1115 (4th Cir. 1990)
(citations omitted) (illustrating that “[t]he possession of unusually large
amounts of cash . . . or the making of uncommonly large cash
purchases . . . may be circumstantial evidence of drug trafficking”).
5
See United States v. DeMarchena, 330 F. Supp. 1223, 1225, 1227
(S.D. Cal. 1971) (stating that after defendant was indicted for transporting
over 2,000 pounds of marijuana into the United States, two unknown persons approached a bail bondsman, tendered a greeting card box containing $55,000 in cash, and attempted to secure the defendant’s release from
custody. After a bail source hearing, the court stated, “[a]t this time the
court knows nothing of the $55,000 in the Hallmark card box, except that
it came from someone who cared enough to send the very best. Whether
this person cares about future court appearances of defendant is doubtful”).
6
See New York v. Esquivel, 601 N.Y.S.2d 541, 545 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1993) (reiterating that “[i]f the funds posted are the fruits of criminal or
unlawful conduct, then a defendant may choose simply to forfeit the collateral and flee. This is a small price to pay for the ‘privilege’ of reaping
hundreds of thousands of dollars in illegal profits prior to apprehension”).
7
See New York v. McIntyre, 640 N.Y.S.2d 386, 390-91 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1996) (noting that bail arrangement violates public policy when “[n]
either defendant nor a close relative has put his own assets at risk” as the
“prospect of loss to the third-party indemnitors in this case is not likely to
provide incentive for defendant to return”).
8
See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:162-12-14 (WEST 2007) (determining “[c]
rime with bail restrictions, that the court may “conduct an inquiry to determine the reliability of the obligor or person posting cash bail . . . [and]
the relationship of the obligor or person posting cash bail to the defendant. . . and that [t]he procedure to determine the sufficiency of bail shall
be governed by rules adopted by the Supreme Court”).
9
See § 2A:162-13 (stating that when a person posts cash bail, the court
may upon the request of the prosecutor conduct inquiries about the reliability of the person offering bail).
10
See id., enabling trial courts to obtain all relevant information relating
to the bail determination, which ensures the integrity of the judicial process.
1
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Esquivel, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 545.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:162-12-14 (2010). These sections discuss
the crimes that qualify for bail, the applicability of a court inquiry, and
even the sufficiency of bail, but fail to fully address the burdens of parties. Procedurally-wise, the statute primarily addresses what a prosecutor
must do for a hearing. Id.
13
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-14 (2010)
14
See N.J. CT. R. 3:26-8 (2010) (expressing that unless a defendant is
charged with a crime listed infra note 20, the “the State must demonstrate
a reasonable and well grounded basis to warrant an inquiry by the court”).
15
New Jersey v. Wright, 980 A.2d 17 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2009).
16
Id.
17
See id. at 19 (stating that the defendant must disclose information
regarding the source of their bail).
18
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:162-12-14 (2010).
19
N.J. CT. R. 3:26-8.
20
See Wright, 980 A.2d at 26 (holding that the “State bears the burden
of persuasion that the bail does not satisfy the requirements”).
21
See infra part IV.
22
An earlier version of the 2004 statute, S-1322 introduced in the New
Jersey Senate on March 14, 2002 by Senator Wayne R. Bryant, limited
bail source hearings to defendants charged with drug offenses under
Chapter 35 of the New Jersey Criminal Code.
23
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:162-13 (2010).
24
These factors include the character, background, and reputation of the
person posting bail. See id.
25
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-14 (2010).
26
From the legislative history, it is apparent that that the Legislature
wanted to give prosecutors this power to thwart gang members pledging bail with criminal proceeds and makes clear that courts would be
required to conduct bail source hearings without any initial showing
by prosecutors. See Assembly Approves Watson Coleman Anti-Street
Gang Package, (May 22, 2006) available at http://vip.politickernj.com/
assembly-majority-leader-bonnie-watson-coleman-6 (“One such piece of
legislation (A2987) would require an investigation into the source of bail
money used in gang-related cases to determine if the funds came from
a legitimate source or an illegitimate one, such as drug sales. The measure clarifies under which an investigation into the source of bail money
would be required, including all first and second degree crimes, any crime
involving a weapons offense and any crime involving alleged gang activity.”).
27
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-12 (2010) (enumerating the following
crimes as being bail restricted: murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, sexual
assault, robbery, carjacking, arson and related offenses, causing or risking
widespread injury or damage, burglary, theft by extortion, endangering
the welfare of a child, arrest, escape, corrupting or influencing a jury, possession of weapons for unlawful purposes, weapons training for illegal
activities, and soliciting or recruiting gang members).
28
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-13 (2010) (providing that when a defendant “posts cash bail or secures a bail bond, the courtshall, upon
the request of the prosecutor, conduct an inquiry to determine the
reliability of the obligor or person posting cash bail, the value and
sufficiency of any security offered, the relationship of the obligor or
person posting cash bail to the defendant and the defendant’s interest in ensuring that the bail is not forfeited, and whether the funds used
to post the cash bail or secure the bail bond were acquired as a result of
criminal or unlawful conduct”).
29
See id. (noting pursuant to this inquiry, the court “may examine,
under oath or otherwise, any person who may possess relevant information,” and may inquire into any other relevant matters, including, inter
alia, the “source of any money or property deposited by any obligor as
security and whether such money or property constitutes the fruits of
11
12
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criminal or unlawful conduct”); see also N.J. CT. R. 3:26-8 (questioning
“whether the funds used to post bail or secure the bail bond were acquired
as a result of criminal or unlawful conduct”).
30
Prosecutors are required to make a prompt review of bail source questionnaire forms.
31
§ 2A:162-13.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:162-12-14 (2010) (stating that the court
can examine a person with relevant information under oath; once the inquiry has been completed, the court must then issue an order approving or
disapproving the bail).
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Compare §1c (stating “a defendant may post bail in any combination
of forms authorized in subsection b. of this section provided the court
does not direct otherwise”) with § 2A:162-13 (specifying that “the court
may, upon the request of the prosecutor, conduct an inquiry to determine
the reliability of the obligor or person posting cash bail”); but see infra
Parts III and IV (discussing Wright, which holds that the state must make
a prima facie showing that the bail arrangement is tainted or otherwise
unsatisfactory before a hearing will be granted, even for bail restricted
crimes).
39
The legislative history makes it clear that the Legislature granted
these powers to prosecutors to thwart gang members from pledging bail
with criminal proceeds, and that courts would be required to conduct bail
source hearings without any initial showing by prosecutors.
40
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-14 (2010).
41
See Bail Source/Sufficiency Hearings – Rule Recommendations –
Publication for Comment at 1-2 Before the Criminal Practice Committee
(2008) (statement of Honorable Edwin H. Stern) (waiting to amend the
rules until Assembly Bill No, 2987 and Senate Bill No. 2012 were signed
into law).
42
N.J. CT. R. 3:26-8.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
See N.J. CT. R. 3:26-8 (noting that if a defendant fails to appear for
his bail source hearing, bail will be revoked, forfeited, and the trial court
is required to issue a bench warrant for the defendant’s arrest).
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
See Bail Source/Sufficiency Hearings, supra note 45 (debating
these critical issues vigorously, the Criminal Practice Committee could
not reach a consensus and thus remained silent on the issues); see also
WRIGHT, 980 A.2D at 20-21 (noting that the state Supreme Court declined
to assign or explain the standard of proof).
49
WRIGHT, 980 A.2D at 17.
50
Id. at 19.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(F) (WEST 2008); Wright, 980 A.2d at 19.
55
WRIGHT, 980 A.2D AT 19.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 19-21.
58
Id. at 20.
59
Id. at 21.
60
See id. at 20-22 (commenting on the analysis which included examining a party’s access to the proofs, considering the tradition that burden of
establishing a fact is generally placed on the person relying thereon, and
the comparative interests of the of the parties).
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WRIGHT, 980 A.2D at 23-25.
Id.
63
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